DUBLIN--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The "Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Ten-Year Market and Technology Forecast" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.
This report identifies the PQC opportunities that will emerge in how the market roadmap for PQC will evolve over the coming decade.
The market for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) already generates revenue and will expand as quantum computers capable of breaking common public key encryption schemes with Shor's algorithm become more widely deployed. For now, post-quantum cryptography finds its market in critical long-lived data such as plans for aircraft and medical databases that need to survive well into the era of powerful quantum computers.
Some IT managers are already aware of the quantum threat and are applying PQC selectively using interim standards and technologies. Many more individuals with purchasing authority are expected to buy into PQC over the next five years as they come to understand quantum threats and quantum computer era gets closer. The addressable market for PQC is can be measured in the billions of units - encryption is hidden everywhere in both hardware and software - and adoption will also accelerate as PQC algorithms are finalized in the NIST selection process.
Key Topics Covered:
Executive Summary
E.1 Post-quantum cryptography -
Future requirements for the entire digital infrastructure
E.2 Uses
of public key cryptography
E.3 Revenue opportunities for
post-quantum cryptography
E.4 Standardization activities
E.5
Seven firms to watch in the post-quantum cryptography space
Chapter One: Introduction
Background to this report
Quantum
security threats: The bottom line
A PQC adoption timetable
1.2
Goals and scope of this report
1.3 Methodology of this report
1.4
Plan of this report
Chapter Two: Post-Quantum Encryption Technology and Products
2.1
Security vulnerabilities for existing public key encryption created by
quantum computers
2.1.1 Role of Shor's algorithm
2.1.2 When
will a solution be needed? A timetable for the quantum computer threat
2.1.3
Time required to implement a new infrastructure
2.1.4 Post-quantum
encryption vs. quantum key distribution (QKD)
2.1.5 Related
vulnerabilities for symmetric cryptographic algorithms and hash functions
2.2
Classification of post-quantum algorithms by NIST
2.2.1 Lattice
based cryptography
2.2.2 Code based cryptography
2.2.3
Multivariate polynomial based cryptography
2.2.4 Hash-based
cryptography
2.2.5 Other cryptographic schemes
2.2.6 Stateful
hash-based signature schemes being proposed by the IETF
2.2.7
Hybrid classical/quantum algorithms
2.3 Post-quantum encryption -
Emerging products and services
2.3.1 Embedded systems
2.3.2
Special purpose post quantum software
2.3.3 Incorporated into
standard internet browsers
2.3.4 Chip level solutions for post
quantum encryption
2.3.5 IT services
2.3.6 Ten year forecast
of post quantum encryption revenue by application segment
Chapter Three: Markets for Post-Quantum Encryption
3.1
Data types that could be at risk
3.1.1 Data value versus data shelf
life
3.1.2 Data types at risk
3 1.3 Will IT managers be
proactive about protecting their data against quantum attacks?
3.2
General forecasting considerations for post-quantum cryptography
3.2.1
Ten-year forecast of overall penetration by post-quantum cryptography
3.2.2
Indirect versus direct revenue considerations
3.3 Civil government
(police, embassies, domestic security)
3.3.1 Market potential for
post-quantum cryptography
3.4 Military, intelligence services and
domestic security agencies
3.5 Financial institutions
3.6
Telecommunications providers
3.7 Data storage and disaster recovery
3.8
Healthcare and medical records
3.9 General business usage
3.10
Consumer usage
Chapter Four: Current Post-Quantum Encryption Companies and
Other Organizations
4.1 Isara
4.2 Envieta Systems LLC
4.3
Post Quantum (PQ Solutions)
4.4 evolutionQ
4.5 Cambridge
Quantum Computing
4.6 Infineon Technologies
4.7 Rambus
Security Division
4.8 IBM Research
4.9 Microsoft Research
4.10
Google Research
4.11 OnBoard Security
4.12 Thales
Communications and Security
4.13 Post-Quantum Advanced Technologies
(PQAT)
Chapter Five: Other Organizations
5.1 National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
5.1.1 Post quantum
encryption selection at NIST
5.1.2 Classes of algorithm
5.2
SafeCrypto
5.3 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
5.3.1
IETF work related to PQC
5.4 National Security Agency (NSA)
5.4.1
NSA work related to PQC
5.5 Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
5.5.1
Quantum safe security working group
5.6 ISO
5.6.1 SC27 WG2
5.7
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
5.8 PQCRYPTO
5.8.1
Collaboration with NIST
5.9 Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE)
5.10 International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
5.11
ANSI Accredited Standards Committee X9
5.12 Open Quantum Safe
For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/hwk76c/postquantum?w=4
